In
Modernity at Large, Arjun Appadurai
sees the imagination of individuals as the key focal point in understanding
contemporary global trends. “More people
than ever before,” he writes, “seem to imagine routinely the possibility that
they or their children will live and work in places other than where they were
born: this is the wellspring of increased rates of migration at every level of
social, national, and global life” (6). With
sly passive voice phraseology, he somewhat acknowledges external factors that
might cause people’s imaginations to kick into action – most notably when
mentioning those who he says “are dragged into new settings,” as with refugee
camps, and those whose imaginations have become fixated with “work, wealth, and
opportunity often because their current circumstances are intolerable”
(6). Any mention, however, of why those circumstances have become
intolerable – of the causes – is notably omitted.
Appadurai instead frames his analysis of media and migration around “the work of the imagination as a constitutive feature of modern subjectivity” (3). Even in the realm of major armed conflicts across the globe, Appadurai points to the ways in which Hollywood and Hong Kong action films “create new cultures of masculinity and violence, which are in turn the fuel for increased violence in national and international politics” (41). He goes on to make a causal link from films and their power to shape the imagination to the resulting new cultures of masculinity, which fuel violence, to the claim that “Such violence is in turn the spur to an increasingly rapid and amoral arms trade that penetrates the entire world” (41). Thus, according to Appadurai, armed conflict across the globe and the proliferation of deadly weapons originates from cultures of masculinity derived from action movies – not private US weapons-producing corporations that have a fiduciary obligation to their shareholders to maximize profit, meaning the manufacture of as many deadly weapons as possible and the lobbying (bribing) of politicians to maximize the transnational flow of those weapons.
Appadurai instead frames his analysis of media and migration around “the work of the imagination as a constitutive feature of modern subjectivity” (3). Even in the realm of major armed conflicts across the globe, Appadurai points to the ways in which Hollywood and Hong Kong action films “create new cultures of masculinity and violence, which are in turn the fuel for increased violence in national and international politics” (41). He goes on to make a causal link from films and their power to shape the imagination to the resulting new cultures of masculinity, which fuel violence, to the claim that “Such violence is in turn the spur to an increasingly rapid and amoral arms trade that penetrates the entire world” (41). Thus, according to Appadurai, armed conflict across the globe and the proliferation of deadly weapons originates from cultures of masculinity derived from action movies – not private US weapons-producing corporations that have a fiduciary obligation to their shareholders to maximize profit, meaning the manufacture of as many deadly weapons as possible and the lobbying (bribing) of politicians to maximize the transnational flow of those weapons.
Throughout Appadurai’s text, his
central mistake is a logical one of cause and effect. If imagination is the original source, the
wellspring, of increased rates of migration, it is only insofar as the ravages
of something else caused one to
imagine leaving. For example, if my
house is destroyed by a flood, it will not take long for me to imagine that I
will likely be living someplace else, and that imagining of a new home, we
could say, will in turn cause me to eventually find one (if I am fortunate
enough). Though, in examining the
totality of that situation, not many people would say, “It was not the flood
that caused his displacement, it was his imagination.” Harsha Walia, in Undoing Border Imperialism, is much more attuned to cause and
effect concerning global migration when she writes, “Capitalism and imperialism
have undermined the stability of communities and compelled people to move in
search of work and survival” (4). Walia
gives a much clearer picture of root causes in her text and is more precise
with her assessment of the impetus for most migration – work and survival –
which seems a much more plausible narrative juxtaposed to Appadurai’s migrant
looking for work, wealth, and opportunity – as if most contemporary migrants were
seduced from their home countries, driven by an attempt to get rich or die
trying.
Although once the effects of global
state-corporate capitalism have caused one to move, could we not then turn to
Appadurai’s theory involving various global cultural flows, or “scapes,” to
understand that which influences displaced peoples to choose one particular
destination over another? For instance,
Appadurai claims that:
images, scripts, models, and narratives
that come through mass mediation (in its realistic and fictional modes) make
the difference between migration today and in the past … For migrants, both the
politics of adaptation to new environments and the stimulus to move or return
are deeply affected by a mass-mediated imaginary that frequently transcends
national space (6).
However,
the findings of a recent report from the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development seriously call this theory into question. Of the countries which dominate the
demonstrable transnational -scapes of media, finance, and technology – the
United States, the United Kingdom, France, Japan, Germany, South Korea, and
Italy – as respective destinations for the world’s migrants, each accounts for
less than three percent (Sedghi). A
great deal more migrants live in China and Romania than in all of the
aforementioned rich countries combined (Sedghi). And of the top five countries which receive
the most migrants – China, Romania, India, Poland, and Mexico (Sedghi) – only
India, with its film industry, could be counted as global disseminator of mass-mediated
content. I should furthermore note that
each of these top five countries rank comparatively low on the United Nations
(UN) Human Development Index (HDI).
China and India in particular, though many commentators rave about their
spectacular rise in GDP in recent decades, have HDIs which reveal that they are
still very poor countries with massive internal social problems – hardly
destinations for people seeking wealth and prosperity. In Health HDI rankings, China is #101; India
is #136 (UNDP). In considering this
picture, it thus becomes apparent that even if imaginations are running wild,
options are limited – and the age old search for work and survival is what
continues to define global migration.
Granted, Modernity at Large was published in 1996, and its composition
likely took place several years before; however, at the Forum d’Avignon in
Paris in 2010, it appears Appadurai’s theoretical foundation, rooted in the
primacy of “culture,” has changed little.
What is even more is that he makes the leap from his supposedly
disinterested analysis, void of prescriptions and final causes (not a
teleological theory [9]) in Modernity,
to one in which he advises “scholars, policy makers, [and] leaders in business,
publishing, and media” that they have an “important burden … to use ‘culture’
to manage ‘social uncertainty,’” social uncertainty caused by two principal
“gaps:” the gap between the lives people see on their screens and the lives
they live, and the gap between those who take risks and those pay the price, in
other words, the realization that “the risk makers and the risk bearers are now
dramatically divided” (Appadurai).
Rather than confront the powerful factions who brought about the 2008
financial crisis, Appadurai sees the dissent of people upset about its
aftermath and fears those trampling herds, seduced by the spectacle’s wares on
their screens, which might threaten the opulence of the minority. This is the essence of “social certainty,”
and elites and their favored intellectuals believe it is something to be “managed”
through education, policy, and media. Notice,
for establishment apologists like Appadurai, it is never the risk takers who
cause “social uncertainty,” requiring a type of “management.”
Appadurai is forced in this
discourse to play a nuanced game though because big businesses need to
manufacture the desire for fashionable consumption in consumers – there is a
multi-billion dollar public relations and marketing industry devoted to it –
but they must also be careful not to fall into the trap about which Appadurai
warns, creating a level of want too intense, causing prospective consumers to
become completely disenchanted with the inflationary gap between the lives on
their screen and their actual lives.
This latter scenario might lead to spontaneous outbursts of violence
like the London riots in August 2011, or, much more terrifying for elites, collective
political actions with the aim of democratizing social and economic spheres, like
those carried out by the Global Justice Movement or Occupy Wall Street. Therefore, the situation requires delicate
management on the part of elite media and information producers.
Appadurai’s pronouncements at the Forum
d’Avignon shatter the sense that his ideas might offer anything new (or that
their newness is a new kind of newness [Appadurai 1]), and they put him in
league with a long tradition of intellectuals like Walter Lippmann and Edward
Bernays who seek to serve establishment power systems by managing and manufacturing
the consent of the governed. The fruits
of Appadurai’s prescription here take us into a future that may render George Orwell’s
vision of a boot stomping on a human face – forever – to be a utopian one. We may find Orwell’s vision of the future to
be utopian because, unlike Appadurai’s, it is one where we still find both
resistance and human faces (Roderick).
In order to understand contemporary
global trends, with types of migration – of people, capital, and violence –
chief among them, it is important to go beyond simply mounting critiques of
intellectuals who serve establishment power systems, though that is
necessary. We should turn to examining
the work of intellectuals and activists who seek out a variety of power systems
and evaluate their legitimacy. If the
power structure in question cannot justify its own existence satisfactorily to
the community which it impacts, it should be changed or dismantled. Individuals worthy of the titles of
intellectual and activist will participate in collective efforts towards
changing or dismantling illegitimate power structures. Walia is exemplary as an intellectual and
activist invested not only in challenging illegitimate power structures, but
also in prefiguring new democratic forms of organization in those very spaces
of resistance.
Remaining attuned to and involved with art and literature is absolutely crucial as one hopes to better understand contemporary global trends. Texaco by Patrick Chamoiseau narrates the history and existence of a shantytown on the outskirts of Fort-de-France, the capital city of the Caribbean island and overseas region of France, Martinique. Its numerous revelations about migration, oppression, writing and representation, and the way in which power functions in a variety of contexts make it a novel which will likely remain relevant and worthy of study for generations. For the remainder of this essay, I will attempt to demonstrate how Texaco, in conjunction with Walia’s Undoing Border Imperialism, provides a counter-argument to Appadurai’s theory of modernity and furthermore illuminates several salient global trends concerning the functioning of power systems and the related movement of people, capital, violence, and ideas.
Remaining attuned to and involved with art and literature is absolutely crucial as one hopes to better understand contemporary global trends. Texaco by Patrick Chamoiseau narrates the history and existence of a shantytown on the outskirts of Fort-de-France, the capital city of the Caribbean island and overseas region of France, Martinique. Its numerous revelations about migration, oppression, writing and representation, and the way in which power functions in a variety of contexts make it a novel which will likely remain relevant and worthy of study for generations. For the remainder of this essay, I will attempt to demonstrate how Texaco, in conjunction with Walia’s Undoing Border Imperialism, provides a counter-argument to Appadurai’s theory of modernity and furthermore illuminates several salient global trends concerning the functioning of power systems and the related movement of people, capital, violence, and ideas.
The way religion is taken up in Texaco provides an interesting point of
departure for the ways in which the text can illuminate some contemporary
global trends. Religious iconography
plays prominently in the novel, but in interesting and sophisticated ways which
require close attention. For example,
much of the narrative is framed by Sophie-Marie Laborieux recounting the
history of her family line from the 1820s to the novel’s present, the late
twentieth century, to a civil functionary – known as the Christ – from the
urban services bureau. Typically, the
coming of Christ is associated with the arrival of redemption and truth, as it
is written in John 14:6 when Jesus Christ declares, “I am the
way, and the truth, and the life.”
However, rather than bringing truth, the Christ in Texaco is subjected to an event upon his arrival which functions as
a metaphor for the impossibility of Truth – with a capital T. The Christ is pelted in the head with a stone
and the narrator asks, “So who threw the stone?” before commenting, “The
answers to this question were so abundant that the real truth forever slipped
through our fingers” (10). In other words,
so many people came to claim that they threw the rock the task of determining
the truth of who threw it becomes impossible.
And instead of bringing redemption,
the Christ brings news of destruction.
However, it is Laborieux’s testimony, along with the will of the
inhabitants who refuse to leave, which ends up saving Texaco from
demolition. The final chapter,
Resurrection, comes with the subheading “not in Easter’s splendor but in the
shameful anxiety of the Word Scratcher who tries to write life” (383). Analyzing the rhetoric of this subheading, we
find that it is “not in Easter’s splendor” – not through Christ, his
resurrection, religion, or any outside savior – but “in the shameful anxiety of
the Word Scratcher” – through Chamoiseau’s own efforts. Throughout the text, there are overtures to
religious iconography, residual of the Judeo-Christian tradition which is the
foundation of Western civilization, and therefore at the foundation of the
colonizing nation of France, but the characters redeem and liberate themselves
through acts which amount to collective struggle.
Perhaps it is that correlative association
between the colonizer and Christianity that causes the inhabitants of Texaco to
view Western religion as a type of oppressive establishment power – of which
the Christ is the representative – and, in the spirit of Frederick Douglass’
truism gleaned as slave, “Power
concedes nothing without a demand. It never did and it never will. Find out
just what any people will quietly submit to and you have found out the exact
measure of injustice and wrong which will be imposed upon them, and these will
continue till they are resisted with either words or blows, or with both”
(1857), they understand that spiritual and material liberation will not come
from above as a type of gift. This
understanding causes the freed slaves to call out to maroons in their hutches
(translated from the Creole), “They didn’t give the damn thing [freedom from
slavery] to us! We’re the ones who took
it” (125).
The
attitude of the inhabitants of Texaco, and their ancestors, towards religion is
furthermore instructive when examining contemporary global trends. Appadurai contends in Modernity that “There is vast evidence in new religiosities of
every sort that religion is not only not dead but that it may be more
consequential than ever in today’s highly mobile and interconnected global
politics” (7). Likewise, around the same
time as Modernity was published, we
can find all sorts of commentary on the emergent primacy of culture and religion
in global affairs, notably Samuel P. Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations.
Huntington’s work, building upon Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man, argues like Appadurai, that
culture and religion will be the defining features of global trends in the
twenty-first century, a line of reasoning which only intensified after the 9/11
attacks. David Cannadine recounts how,
“In the aftermath of 9/11, some historians also jumped on the ‘clash of
civilizations’ bandwagon, among them Geoffrey Wheatcroft and Anthony Pagden,
who produced books depicting a world irretrievably and violently sundered,
initially between the East and the West, and subsequently between Christianity
and Islam, extending from the confrontations among the ancient Greeks and
Persians, via such battles as Poitiers and Lepanto, down to the conflicts of
the present day” (Cannadine). However,
when we account for the way religion operates in the context of coercive power
systems, as the characters in Texaco do,
it becomes increasingly difficult to view religion as the chief driver of
global trends, least of all the contributor of a simple and direct ‘clash of
civilizations.’
It
is important to remember that, through Operation Cyclone, the Islamic
fundamentalists in the Taliban who have wrought extreme violence and repression
in Afghanistan, and have been the main foe of invading US forces there,
received about $3 billion in military weaponry and training from US taxpayers
over the course of the 1980s (Bergen 68).
Furthermore, arguably the most fundamentalist Islamic country in the
world, Saudi Arabia, has been a strategic ally of the US for most of the
twentieth century, a relationship which continues to the present, and likewise Bahrain,
whose state religion is Islam, hosts the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet. Factors like these cause many prominent
political commentators, such as Noam Chomsky, to seriously doubt the ‘clash of
civilizations’ narrative. Chomsky,
however, takes a nuanced view of the way religion functions in the context of
state-corporate power systems.
He
notes how even though the US is “one of the most fundamentalist countries
in the world and a strong supporter of extreme Islamic fundamentalism” (“On
Religion”), it also “carried out a virtual war against the church [liberation
theology] in central America in the 1980’s primarily because prime elements in
the church were working with great courage and honor to help those in need”
(“Remarks”). It seems thus that the
clash of civilizations narrative, and similar conjecturing about the primacy or
growing influence of religion in global political affairs, is often a
smokescreen used by people in power, whether in an effort to drum up antagonism
(those different people are against you!) or to marshal support (vote for him –
he is a Christian!). Those who remain
critical of the way religion is used and abused in power systems, regardless of
whether they themselves adhere to a religion or not, position themselves in a
much better place – like the aforementioned characters in Texaco – to challenge illegitimate power systems and cultivate
sites of democratic agency.
Another major global trend that Texaco helps to illuminate pertains to
migration. In the novel, the cataclysmic
event which forces Esternome, Laborieux’s father, and scores of others, from
the outlying hills into the city of Fort-de-France is a volcanic eruption. Laborieux indicates in her narration that
this event altered the landscape of the affected area of Martinique, saying,
“My Esternome no longer recognized the landscape that he had crossed going in
the other direction with Ninon in his youth” (148). There are further clues that the amount of
people displaced from this event is considerable, as Laborieux remarks, “No
gendarme asked for [Esternome’s] papers, since there were just too many of them
like that, you know, who had landed on the grasslands of the Fort” (162). Also significant are the attitudes of those
in the colonial power center of Fort-de-France, and how they received those who
had been displaced from this event. There is the aforementioned suspension of
bureaucratic regulation; however, from Laborieux’s notebook, she writes from
the point of view of the refugees, stating, “And Fort-de-France greeted us the
way one does a title wave (162) … [and later]… once mild pity had its fill,
Fort-de-France suspected them [the environmental refugees] of being vagabonds”
(164). This cataclysmic event in the
narrative can draw our attention to the way in which climate and environmental
factors have been a significant cause of migration historically, even before
anthropogenic global warming began to manifest, as with dustbowl refugees in
the US in the 1930s, and it portrays in stark terms how environmental migrants,
“thus vegetating there like sheep at the doors of a slaughterhouse” (163) are
not often welcomed or supported as they mount “attempts to penetrate City”
(190).
This scenario in the text carries a
great deal of relevance to the contemporary global situation pertaining to
migration, a situation which, according to numerous credible sources, is
worsening due to anthropogenic global warming.
Walia argues that “The ecological crisis is another manifestation of how
capitalism propels migration” (51). She
goes on to cite a recent study by the American Association for the Advancement
of Science which estimates that “by the year 2020 there will be fifty million
climate refugees displaced by climate-induced disasters including droughts,
desertification, and mass flooding” (51).
The Norwegian Refugee Council estimates that already, in 2008 alone,
about 20 million people may have been displaced by climate-induced sudden-onset
natural disasters (Guterres). Therefore,
for many thousands of people, the scenario I drew up at the outset of this
essay about a flood and the reactive work of imagination is not at all
hypothetical. Consistent with his
tendency to omit causes, neither climate nor other environmental factors play a
role in Appadurai’s theory of migration in Modernity. A Google search and an advanced search of the
University of Louisville Library database did not turn up any results of
Appadurai’s work which addresses climate change, with the exception of his blog
page at the World Bank, where he is a consultant. The heading of this page is “Development in a
Changing Climate: Making our Future Sustainable,” though the main content area
of the page is blank.
In terms of treatment of climate
migrants and migrants in general, Texaco
is also insightful. Beyond the picture
of “sheep at the doors of a slaughterhouse,” Esternome follows Adrienne
Carmélite Lapidaille for basic sustenance while he finds work; Idoménée, who
migrates to Fort-de-France at a younger age, tellingly works in a variety of
precarious, poorly paid, and transient jobs around the city. She “became a gardener of some plump mulattos
… a storytelling mammy … a cleaning lady in a workshop … a market vendor … an
aqueduct sweeper … a stone harvester, coal carter, she became this and then that”
(171). The treatment migrants receive
and their labor to which they are subjected in Fort-de-France – a place which
reconstitutes the post-colonial subject, ever forcefully, from an often rural
identity to an ill-adjusted outsider living inside a properly European outpost
(Kemedjio 137) – reinforces and illuminates a corresponding crucial point Walia
makes about migration. She writes how “The
state process of illegalization of migrant and undocumented workers, through
the denial of full legal status that forces a condition of permanent precarity,
actually legalizes the trade in their bodies and labor by domestic capital”
(70). She adds, summing up the point,
that “Migrant and undocumented workers thus are the flip side of transnational
capitalist outsourcing, which itself requires border imperialism and racialized
empire to create different zones of labor” (71). Therefore, in light of Walia’s point, we can
reasonably imagine that the suspension of bureaucratic coercion after the
volcanic eruption (“no gendarme asked for his papers”) is perhaps not a
disinterested act of bewilderment or benevolence.
Additionally, reading Texaco with Undoing Border Imperialism is useful in illuminating the
constitutive associations between overlapping oppressive and exploitative forms
of labor in the realms of migration, corporate outsourcing, and
post-colonialism. Building upon Walia’s
point that migrant labor domestically is the flip side of outsourced labor, in Texaco, we get a picture of the exploitative
labor in the post-colonial setting which is the flip side to slave labor – and
a form of exploited labor which corresponds to the sweatshops of outsourcing
and the precarity of migrant labor. In
the latter part of what the text refers to as the Age of Straw, sometime in the
mid to late 19th century, the dwindling agricultural labor, it becomes clear,
takes the a form of non-paid oppressive labor analogous to slavery. Ninon, Esternome’s lover at one point, recounts
the post-slavery agricultural situation in Saint Pierre, a town about 20 miles
to the north of Fort-de-France:
The governors, one after the other, set up
banks. Loans made the wage payments
possible. But it was just as difficult
for the planters to recoup their wage debts.
It was no blackman’s ambition to sweat in the old chains. Those who resigned themselves to it demanded
a rhythm other than slavery’s. That
bothered the békés’ luxury. So they sent
for other models of slave (138).
“Sending
for other models of slave” refers to the French state and industrial managers
bringing migrants from India and Portugal (138) in an attempt to replace the
slave labor the free people would no longer abide. Here, we see the “in-sourcing” of migrants
just as this situation demonstrates the transnational reach of capital. The vast majority of the native population
though does not have the resources to leave.
This disparity of movement which
constitutes the labor situation on Martinique in Texaco is a core feature of contemporary globalization – one to which
Walia devotes a great deal of attention, and one which Appadurai sorely
neglects. Walia articulates the crux of
this disparity, writing, “Capital, and the transnationalization of its
production and consumption, is freely mobile across borders, while the people
displaced as a consequence of the ravages of neoliberalism and imperialism are
constructed as demographic threats and experience limited mobility” (4). Increasing border securitization, which
perpetrates a great deal of racialized and often misogynist (Walia 44) violence
against migrants the world over, and corporatist so-called free-trade
agreements like the North American Free Trade Agreement and the Trans-Pacific
Partnership further exacerbate this disparity of movement. Internally, as corporations continue to
pillage natural resources, pollute communities, and contribute to the
concentration of wealth and the maintenance of a permanent underclass, the
forms of management of “social uncertainty” that Appadurai solicits from
policy-makers and business elites will necessarily intensify. (On a related note, Chris Hedges notices
another migratory pattern, one rarely discussed in mainstream sources. The basis of his warning – “As the U.S.
empire implodes, the harsher forms of violence employed on the outer reaches of
empire are steadily migrating back to the homeland” – is plain to see in the
increasing militarization of not only borders, but also local police forces [“Militarization
of Police”].)
Returning to Texaco, the founding of the quasi-autonomous zone stems from a
desire to be free from institutional racism, government coercion, and the
industrial nightmare – “The roar of steel.
Decisive toothed wheels. An
untamable smell” (140) – which, before decades of violent labor struggle, as in
virtually all industrialized nations, was an extraordinarily dangerous place to
be. Like many who face the repression of
border imperialism, the members of Texaco are carving out this autonomous space
of liberation in order to survive. Near
the conclusion of the text, Laborieux gives the reader a sense of the
autonomous and democratic nature of Texaco when she recounts that “we reinvented everything: laws, urban
codes, neighborhood relations, settlement and construction rules (317) [italics
mine]. We can juxtapose the democratic
and autonomous establishment of Texaco to the hierarchical and undemocratic
production of space in Fort-de-France based on “A Quick Look at Idoménée’s
Musings” (175), as she describes the city founding thusly: “They say: old swamp
but pretty site. They set up the fort
there. Then the Army spoke its law. A checkerboard stretch strung from the
fort. Businesses here. Houses there.
Depots here” (175). Also notable in
the juxtaposition of these two distinct spaces is that word which holds so much
significance for Appadurai: imagination.
Appadurai argues against critics of
mass culture who claim that “the imagination will be stunted by forces of
commoditization, industrial capitalism, and the general regimentation and
secularization of the world” (6), refuting these critics on the basis that
religion is becoming more consequential and that electronic media are not simply
dumbing people down. The first objection
I addressed previously in this essay and to his second objection, I would
agree, but with the large caveat that the relentless war against the human
imagination waged by the state-corporate apparatus is much bigger than
electronic media. David Graeber
concludes:
It does often seem that, whenever there is
a choice between one option that makes capitalism seem the only possible
economic system, and another that would actually make capitalism a more viable
economic system, neoliberalism means always choosing the former … Yet as a
result of putting virtually all their efforts in one political basket, we are
left in the bizarre situation of watching the capitalist system crumbling
before our very eyes, at just the moment everyone had finally concluded no
other system would be possible.
The
Occupy Movement which began in New York in the fall of 2011 is precisely an
attempt to prefigure and imagine what a future society that is democratic and
encourages human creativity might be like.
This is why in the encampments worldwide, as recent as the massive
occupation of Taksim Gezi Park in Istanbul, Turkey in 2013, all began by
collectively rebuilding and reimagining society from the ground up, in a very
similar manner to the reinvention Laborieux describes in Texaco. At the Gezi Park
occupation for example, protesters constructed their own food distribution
center, library, garden, medical center, veterinary clinic, art constellations,
and media outreach – all organized along horizontalist, democratic lines
(Hattam).
There was a great deal of speculation following the violent dispersal of Occupy encampments as to whether the movement was a success or a failure. After all, as Andrew Kliman writes, “Occupy Wall Street never occupied Wall Street. Even Zuccotti Park was ‘occupied’ only with the consent of the mayor of New York City, and it was cleared out the moment he withdrew that consent. In the end, no autonomous space was reclaimed.” However, there are many dimensions to consider beyond Kliman’s short-sighted snap judgment. Cultivating imaginative spaces where people can experiment with and engage in democratic practices is a vital and foundational part in creating a more just future society. And in an atomized society like the United States, it is hard to understate the importance of events which bring activists together, so that they may unite to carry out collective action in the future – from fast food strikes, to pipeline blockades, to immigrant rights actions, to involvement in many other ongoing causes. Occupy Sandy, Gezi Park, and other continuations of the movement pop up in new places all over the world, and take different forms, just as commentators, praising and criticizing, thought that Occupy represented a continuation of the Global Justice Movement (Pleyers). Everything ceases to exist at some point, but ceasing to exist hardly constitutes failure.
There was a great deal of speculation following the violent dispersal of Occupy encampments as to whether the movement was a success or a failure. After all, as Andrew Kliman writes, “Occupy Wall Street never occupied Wall Street. Even Zuccotti Park was ‘occupied’ only with the consent of the mayor of New York City, and it was cleared out the moment he withdrew that consent. In the end, no autonomous space was reclaimed.” However, there are many dimensions to consider beyond Kliman’s short-sighted snap judgment. Cultivating imaginative spaces where people can experiment with and engage in democratic practices is a vital and foundational part in creating a more just future society. And in an atomized society like the United States, it is hard to understate the importance of events which bring activists together, so that they may unite to carry out collective action in the future – from fast food strikes, to pipeline blockades, to immigrant rights actions, to involvement in many other ongoing causes. Occupy Sandy, Gezi Park, and other continuations of the movement pop up in new places all over the world, and take different forms, just as commentators, praising and criticizing, thought that Occupy represented a continuation of the Global Justice Movement (Pleyers). Everything ceases to exist at some point, but ceasing to exist hardly constitutes failure.
Similar questions resonate at the
conclusion of Texaco, and once again,
the novel has much to offer our contemporary situation. Laborieux, whose storytelling effort with the
Christ has saved Texaco from demolition, reveals that he has informed her that
“City would integrate Texaco’s soul, that everything would be improved but that
everything would remain in accordance with its fundamental law, with its
alleys, places, with its so old memory which the country needed” (381). This may seem in some ways like Texaco will
be co-opted or assimilated by the post-colonial power structure and thus lose
its autonomous character, but Texaco is a constant work in progress – “rich
with what we were and strong with a legend that was becoming clearer and
clearer to us” (381). I also would argue
that co-option is not necessarily always hopeless or a sign of defeat. (As Graeber asks, “Would anyone claim that
because feminism has been co-opted into corporate culture that feminism lost?”) Furthermore, Laborieux gives us an optimistic
picture of Texaco near the end of the text, stating, “In our mind, the soil under
the houses remained strangely free, definitely
free” (319). This leaves the reader
with the hopeful impression that, even if things look bleak or impossible, for
those who believe it, revolution is always near the surface.
Works Cited:
"(1857)
Frederick Douglass, If There Is No Struggle, There Is No Progress." Blackpast.org.
Blackpast.org, n.d. Web. 28 Apr. 2014.
Appadurai, Arjun.
"Development in a Changing Climate: Making Our Future Sustainable." Blogs.worldbank.org.
The World Bank Group, n.d. Web. 28 Apr. 2014.
Appadurai, Arjun, and Bernard Stiegler. "Forum D'Avignon 2010 - Video
01 - Arjun Appadurai Et Bernard Stiegler." YouTube. YouTube, 04
Sept. 2012. Web. 28 Apr. 2014.
Appadurai, Arjun. Modernity
at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization. Minneapolis, MN: U of
Minnesota, 1996. Print.
Bergen, Peter L. Holy
War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama Bin Laden. New York: Free,
2001. Print.
Cannadine, David.
"Getting Beyond the 'Clash of Civilizations'" History News Network.
George Mason History News Network, 6 May 2013. Web. 28 Apr. 2014.
Chamoiseau,
Patrick. Texaco. Trans. Rose-Myriam Réjouis and Val Vinokur. New York:
Pantheon, 1997. Print.
Chomsky, Noam, and
Amina Chaudary. "On Religion and Politics, Noam Chomsky Interviewed by
Amina Chaudary." Chomsky.info. Chomsky.info, Apr.-May 2007. Web. 28
Apr. 2014.
Chomsky, Noam.
"Remarks on Religion, Noam Chomsky Interviewed by Various
Interviewers." Chomsky.info. Chomsky.info, 1990 - 1999. Web. 28
Apr. 2014.
DeLillo, Don. Underworld. New
York: Scribner, 1997. Print.
Graeber, David.
"A Practical Utopian's Guide to the Coming Collapse." The Baffler.
The Baffler Foundation Inc., 22 Nov. 2013. Web. 28 Apr. 2014.
Guterres, António.
"UNHCR Policy Paper: Climate Change, Natural Disasters and Human
Displacement: A UNHCR Perspective." UNHCR News. UNHCR: The UN
Refugee Agency, 14 Aug. 2009. Web. 28 Apr. 2014.
Hattam, Jennifer.
"Occupy Istanbul? Inside the Growing Mini-City at Gezi Park." The
Atlantic: Cities. The Atlantic Monthly Group, 07 June 2013. Web. 28 Apr.
2014.
Hedges, Chris.
"Elites Will Make Gazans of Us All." Truthdig.com. Truthdig,
LLC, 19 Nov. 2012. Web. 28 Apr. 2014.
"John
14:6." King James Version. Bible Hub, n.d. Web. 28 Apr. 2014.
Kemedjio, Cilas. “De Ville Cruelle De Mongo Beti à Texaco De
Patrick Chamoiseau: Fortification, Ethnicité Et Globalisation Dans La Ville
Postcoloniale.” L'Esprit Créateur 41.3 (2001): 136-50. Print.
Kliman, Andrew.
"The Make-Believe World of David Graeber." With Sober Senses.
Marxist-Humanist Initiative, 13 Apr. 2012. Web. 28 Apr. 2014.
"Militarization
of Police." Blog of Rights. American Civil Liberties Union, n.d.
Web. 28 Apr. 2014.
"Table 7:
Health | Data | United Nations Development Programme." UNDP Open Data.
United Nations Development Programme, 2011. Web. 28 Apr. 2014.
Pleyers, Geoffrey.
"The Global Justice Movement as a Precursor of Occupy Wall Street & Indignados:
Theoretical Background and Previous Experiments." Academia.edu.
Academia, 2014. Web. 28 Apr. 2014.
Roderick, Rick.
"Orwell Was a Pie Eyed Optimist." YouTube. YouTube, 13 Nov.
2009. Web. 28 Apr. 2014.
Sedghi, Ami.
"International Migration: Where Do People Go and Where From?" Theguardian.com.
Guardian News and Media, 12 July 2011. Web. 28 Apr. 2014.
Walia,
Harsha. Undoing Border Imperialism. Oakland, CA: AK, 2013. Print.
H.
W. Honeycutt is the author of "Universal Basic Income and Disability"
published by
Red
Lion Press. @HWHoneycutt
No comments:
Post a Comment